Previous research (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000) suggests that children can use category labels to make inductive inferences about non-obvious causal properties of objects. However, such inductive generalizations can fail to predict objects' causal properties when A) the property being projected varies within the category; B) the category is arbitrary (e.g., things smaller than a bread box), or C) the property being projected is due to an exogenous intervention rather than intrinsic to the object kind. In four studies, we show that preschoolers (mean: 48 months; range: 42-57 months) are sensitive to these constraints on induction and selectively engage in exploration when evidence about objects' causal properties conflicts with inductive generalizations from the objects' kind to their causal powers. This suggests that the exploratory actions children generate in free play could support causal learning.
Inductive inferences and exploratory play Page 7 of 34 explore more when there is casual variability within a genuine category than when there is causal variability within an arbitrary category (where the evidence is potentially consistent with inductive generalizations from genuine kind differences). In the case of evidence that contradicts (relatively weak) inductive generalizations from perceptually based categories, we suggest that children may explore more than they do for arbitrary kinds but less than for genuine kinds.
Finally, some properties support inductive projections better than others. Perhaps the most famous property that fails to license induction is the property of 'grue' --the property of being green until some future time t and blue thereafter. As the philosopher Nelson Goodman observed, it seems rational to use the evidence of emeralds seen so far to conclude that all emeralds are green but, although equally consistent with the evidence, it does not seem rational to conclude that all emeralds are grue (1955) . Philosophers (e.g., Quine, 1969) have explained this discrepancy by suggesting that properties may only be projectible to the extent that they track stable causal relations in the world (much as natural kind categories support induction to the extent that they unite entities that share real causal relationships in the world). One implication of this account is that a causal property will not be projectible if the property is not a stable property of the kind but is instead due to an arbitrary intervention. If for instance, you rub a balloon to create static cling, it will have the property of sticking to walls without licensing the inference that other (un-rubbed) balloons will stick to walls. That is, if a property is not an intrinsic property of a kind but is instead due to an arbitrary intervention, the property may not be projectible to other members of the kind. Experiment 4 looks at whether children's exploratory play is sensitive to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties of object kinds; we predict that children will explore more when an intrinsic property of a kind varies within the category (and there is thus a conflict between the inductive generalization from object kind to causal properties and the observed evidence) than when a property incidental to the kind varies within the category (and thus any discrepancy between the evidence and the inductive generalization can be explained by the arbitrary intervention) 1 .
In summary, the studies to follow look at how conflicts between the predictions of inductive inference and observed evidence affect children's exploratory play (see Table 1 for an overview of the experiments and predicted results). Throughout, our dependent measure is based on children's exploratory play with objects in which the target causal property is absent. By investigating children's play with inert objects, we can eliminate the distraction of the interesting causal property itself and focus specifically on how children's predictions affect their play. We suggest that children will spontaneously engage in more exploratory actions when evidence about objects' causal properties conflicts with their inductive generalizations than when the absence of the objects' causal property is potentially consistent with such generalizations. If children do engage in this selective exploration, then children's exploratory actions could support causal discovery specifically in contexts where other inductive cues to an object's causal powers are unreliable.
Experiment 1
As noted, considerable research has looked at the relationship between children's knowledge about object categories and their inferences about unobserved properties (Disendruck & Gelman, 1999; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gopnik & Nazzi, 2003; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Keil, Smith, Simons, & Levin, 1998; Nazzi & Gopnik, 2000; Simons & Keil, 1995) .
However, such studies have looked primarily at whether children will extend inductive inferences from one token of a type to another. Relatively few studies (though see Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002 and Gelman & Raman, 2003, for exceptions) have looked at the scope of children's inferences (e.g., at the extent to which children believe the property applies generically, to all tokens of the type). In this experiment, we look at how children's assumption that a causal property extends across all the members of a category affects their exploratory play.
We introduce children to a set of blocks called "blickets". Children learn that these blocks are magnetic. They are then introduced to second set of blocks. Half the children are told that the blocks in the second set are "blickets"; half are told that they are "dax". When all of the blocks belong to the same category children should assume that the new blocks are magnetic.
If the children try one block from the second set and find that it fails to stick (i.e., the evidence conflicts with their inductive inferences) they should explore the other blocks. However, when the second set of blocks belongs to a different category, finding that a single member of that category is inert should suffice for children to infer that all the members of the category are inert;
the evidence is consistent with their inductive inferences and children should be less likely to explore the novel blocks.
Method Participants
Thirty-two three and four-year-olds (47% girls; range: 42 months to 57 months, mean: 48 months) were recruited for the study. Half the children were randomly assigned to a One Kind condition, half to a Two Kind condition. Throughout these studies, children were recruited from visitors to a metropolitan science museum. Most of the children were from white, middle-class backgrounds but a range of ethnicities representing the diversity of the population was involved.
Materials
Two sets of cylindrical purple blocks (10 cm tall; 6 cm diameter) with yellow ends were used. One set consisted of five blocks on which the yellow end of each block was magnetic.
The second set consisted of ten inert blocks. A 30 cm by 30 cm magnet board was set upside down on four legs (60 cm tall) so that if the magnetic blocks were stuck to the bottom of the board, they would hang suspended. Inert blocks would of course fall from the board.
Procedure
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The children were tested individually in a quiet corner of the museum. The experimenter placed the first set of five blocks on the table. (See Figure 1a for stimuli and design). She said, "See these? These are blickets. Watch this!" She then stuck one of the blocks to the magnet board so it hung suspended. The child was then allowed to try. After the child had stuck all five blocks to the board, the experimenter poured the second set of ten blocks onto the table. In the "One Kind" condition she said, "And here are some blickets"; in the "Two Kind" condition she said, "And here are some dax". She then told the child, "I have to go write something down for a minute. You go ahead and play." The experimenter walked out of the child's sight. Children were allowed to play freely with both sets of blocks for up to 60 seconds or until they turned away from the play table. The free play session was videotaped for coding. Only children who played for at least 30 seconds were included in the study; all children met the inclusion criteria.
At the end of the trial, the experimenter returned, thanked the child, and terminated the study.
Results and Discussion
Throughout, all values reported as significant have p-values of .05 or less; two-tailed tests are used except when noted; results reported as non-significant are non-significant by both one and two-tailed tests. We analyzed children's play in three ways. We looked at children's overall play time, the number of blocks from the second (inert) set that children tried to stick to the board, and the number of children who tried to stick more than a single block from the inert set to the board. Because we could not be sure that the number of blocks children would try would be normally distributed, we use non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U tests) rather than parametric Children's performance in Experiments 1 and 2 is consistent with previous work (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000) suggesting that children will treat perceptually similar stimuli differently depending on how they are labeled. In general however, perceptual cues (like an object's shape and color) are informative about kind membership; in the absence of differential object labels, children might infer that all the purple, cylindrical blocks are members of a common kind -and therefore that they also have common causal properties. This suggests that the results of the "One Kind" and "Both Kinds" conditions of Experiments 1 and 2
should replicate even if the objects are referred to only with a descriptive category label: "purple ones".
However, as noted, perceptual cues are sometimes misleading about kind membership:
entities that look alike can belong to different categories and have different unobserved properties and entities that look different can belong to a common category and have the same unobserved properties. Thus perceptually based categories, like "purple ones", might be a weaker basis for inductive inference than categories based on object labels, like "blickets".
Moreover, if the perceptual categorization captures only arbitrary similarities between objects and fails to respect genuine category boundaries, inductive inferences based a perceptual category might be altogether unwarranted. Given for instance, that pigs like to play in the mud, it might be reasonable to infer that "the muddy ones" will say, "oink"; however, it would not be reasonable to make this inference after throwing mud on a chicken coop. To test whether children are sensitive to gradations in the inductive power of genuine, perceptually based, and
Inductive inferences and exploratory play Page 22 of 34 children also engaged in selective exploration of ambiguous evidence. When inductive inferences about an object's properties based on its kind membership conflicted with observed data about the object preschoolers seemed to be sensitive to the ambiguous status of other tokens of the type and extensively tested individual objects. This suggests that children are not only sensitive to the distinction between evidence that does and does not disambiguate causal relationships (see e.g., Masnick & Klahr, 2003 and Sodian, Zaitchik, & Carey, 1991) , but actively explore ambiguous evidence.
Do children actually learn the relationship between object kinds and causal properties from the evidence of their own interventions? Our experiment does not address this directly.
As noted, there are many different things children might discover through trial and error exploration (e.g., that not all blickets activate the toy or that there are subtle features distinguishing blickets that do activate the toy from those that do not). In simple cases like those described here, it seems probable that children do learn for instance, at least that not all members of the kind have the causal property. However, we do not want to suggest that in all cases children's free play reliably leads to accurate learning. Informative interventions might occur relatively infrequently in the course of play and children might fail to attend to the evidence they generate. Nonetheless, children's tendency to engage in selective exploration when their inductive inferences fail could be advantageous; whether or not children learn from their explorations in any particular instance, overall, children would be more likely to investigate where there is something to be learned.
Children's exploratory behavior could be informative even if it were simply an index of children's causal judgments. However, the current studies suggest that children's spontaneous exploratory actions are closely linked to rational processes of inductive inferences. Such exploratory actions provide not only useful indicators of what children already know, but also a powerful way for children to gain new knowledge. If, even when children are "just playing", they 
